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Abstract
When and how did the laundering of ‘dirty’ money become an object of public concern, debate,
and ultimately policy at the intersection of finance and security? This article sheds light on the
social construction of money laundering as a public problem in the context of the U.S. War on
Drugs during the 1970s and 1980s. By doing so, the article also stresses the heuristic value
of questioning the finance-security nexus through an analytics of public problems. Its aims are
to: (1) avoid interdisciplinary debates around the finance-security nexus becoming trapped in a
zero-sum game between the ‘securitization of finance’ and the ‘financialization of security’;
and (2) understand better the emergence, re-configuration, and internal tensions of social
spaces at the interface of finance and security.
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Introduction
From news on politics, financial scandals, and crime, to the literature and films inspired by it,
references to the laundering of ‘dirty’ money have become so common that the existence,
definition, and need to tackle the ‘problem’ all appear self-evident. Yet the conversion of
money laundering into an object of public concern, debate, and ultimately policy, remains a
relatively recent phenomenon, with the first legislation on money laundering only enacted in
the United States in 1986. While almost every single social fact can in principle become a
public problem, such a process cannot take place anywhere or at anytime (Best, 2016; Neveu,
2015). Previous national and international regulatory initiatives to police flows of money in
relation to illicit activities, starting with tax evasion, had been largely ineffective, mainly due to
opposition from proponents of bank secrecy (Helleiner, 1999). What prompted the change
beginning in 1986? How might we analyze the framing of money laundering as a public
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problem? Who did this framing address, and with what consequences? These questions sit at
the heart of the intersection of finance and security that this special issue seeks to address.
Does the birth of anti-money laundering constitute a securitization of the financial system by
rendering and governing banking activities as a security problem? Or, on the contrary, should it
be interpreted as a financialization of security that empowers financial actors in the
governance of security?
This article looks at what Foucault (1977: 76) once called “the singularity of events
outside any monotonous finality”, in order to understand how ‘dirty money’ has been
identified, framed, justified, and popularized as a critical public policy issue. Focusing on the
social construction of dirty money that led to the invention of a new crime, 'money laundering',
the article has a twofold purpose.1 First, it aims to provide an original contribution to the
research tradition on ‘social/public problems’ (Becker, 1963; Best, 2016; Cefaï, 1996;
Gusfield, 1980; Spector and Kitsuse, 1977) by outlining what I call the ‘associational
construction of public problems’. Second, in connection with interdisciplinary debates about
the finance-security nexus (Aitken, 2011; Boy, 2015; de Goede, 2012; Epstein, 2005; Langley,
2008; 2013; Martin, 2002; 2007), it stresses the heuristic value of approaching this nexus
through an analytics of public problems as an alternative to governmentality. Indeed, the
finance-security literature is marked by a pervasive engagement with the governmentality
literature, including the author of the present article (Amicelle, 2011). This literature has
examined the “space[s] of the ‘conduct of conducts’, where technologies of government and
technologies of the self intersect” (Walters, 2011: 15), applied in this instance at the interface
of the fields of finance and security. Both fields “share a claim to universal applicability in (all)
other social fields, resulting in various forms of financialization and securitization” (Boy et al.,
2011: 115). The aim here is not to oppose the body of work informed by governmentality
studies, but to complement it by asking how such in-between spaces can emerge or be re-
configured by the social construction of public problems. In other words, the analytics of public
problems makes it possible to better understand the genealogy of social spaces at the
interface of finance and security, defined either as assemblages (de Goede, forthcoming) or
configuration (Amicelle, 2017). As will be shown, a focus on public problems makes it possible
to avoid debates on the finance-security nexus becoming trapped in a zero-sum game between
the ‘securitization of finance’ and the ‘financialization of security’.
The social construction of public problems by association
How the social facts covered by the notion of ‘money laundering’ became a public problem is
not easy to understand using typical categories of analysis. First, it differs from processes
associated with the extension or expansion of public problems (Becker, 1963; Nelson, 1984).
The construction of public problems by extension or expansion can be thought of as the
“integration of new issues into a family of ‘problems’ already being addressed, which often
offers the advantage, especially for young administrations or new authorities, of consolidating
the institution, justifying its reinforcement” (Neveu, 2015: 79). Becker (1963) provides an
example of this process with the 1937 case in which the U.S. Federal Bureau of Narcotics
added marijuana to the list of ‘problems’ it was addressing. By helping to identify marijuana as
a public problem, leading to its criminalization, the American Bureau of Narcotics increased its
power and authority. In this context, the social construction of marijuana as a public problem
expanded a generic category – illicit drugs – by adding a new substance to that category. The
idea of construction by association, however, is quite different. It focuses on the operations
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that occur when a social fact or a former public problem is transformed into a new subject for
debate and public action, while constantly being compared to one or more ‘primary problems’.
Construction by association with another ‘problem’ cannot be reduced to simply including a
social fact in a generic category requiring public action, such as illicit drugs. Rather, it is a
process that consists in elucidating a specific issue by systematically connecting it with
another related, but different issue, which can be designated as the ‘primary problem’, or the
problem of reference.
As a social practice, money laundering is the second in a series of actions: it follows an
initial criminal activity in which the ‘dirty’ proceeds of crime that must be ‘laundered’ are first
acquired. In this process, the dirtiness of money refers to other public problems. At first
glance, it seems that the desire to disguise the illegal origin of money could be associated with
a wide range of personal and property crimes, including trafficking and white-collar crimes.
However, money laundering and the resulting state intervention against ‘dirty’ money were
created and legitimized in the United States in association with only one ‘problem’: drug
trafficking. While the immediate and exclusive association of dirty money with drug money has
progressively faded and the problem of laundering has expanded, the early association with
drugs has continued to shape the way financial policing agents think and act.
To understand the long-term effect of such ‘constructive’ association requires a focus on
the configuration of actors and institutions, as well as the larger sociopolitical context, which
can transform a social fact into an object of public concern and eventually of public policy. In
the following sections, I first insist on a redefinition of the issue of organized crime that
contributed to the extension of the ‘War on Drugs’ in the United States, starting in the 1970s. I
then examine the opposition to efforts to further monitor and control flows of money during
that same period. Lastly, I shed light on the events that constructed the problem of money
laundering, and its acknowledgment in the banking industry, by associating it with America’s
‘folk devil’ of the 1980s: drug traffickers. The last section shows how the penetration of such a
security-related issue into the field of finance also reverberated throughout the field of
security. The story told in these sections derives from a documentary analysis based on both
academic works and official resources from Congress, presidential investigative committees
on organized crime, the American Bankers Association, and federal agencies, such as the
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).
America's security and its folk devils
While the first half of the twentieth century had seen national conferences and international
agreements on drugs, the focus on drug trafficking in the United States increased significantly
towards the end of the 1960s.2 Upon his inauguration in 1969, President Richard Nixon
immediately employed war metaphors. “Drug traffic is public enemy number one domestically
in the United States today”, he declared, “and we must wage a total offensive, worldwide,
nationwide, government-wide, and, if I might say so, media-wide” (quoted in Epstein, 1977:
174). During the era, the United States already considered dealing with this form of trafficking
a priority in domestic and international politics. The committment was especially apparent in
the diplomatic agreement of political representatives on the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs of 1961, continuing with the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, and the
adoption of the 1972 Protocol amending the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. There
had been clear support for these types of multilateral initiatives as early as the first opium
conference in Shanghai in 1909, which led to the signing of the international convention at
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The Hague in 1912. Friman (1996), examining the United States’ constant involvement in this
domain, points out, somewhat ironically, that the twentieth century ended the way it began,
with the United States fighting drug trafficking. On the other hand, Andreas and Nadelmann
(2006) argue that ‘the modern era’ for this fight dates back to the anti-drug campaign
launched in the 1960s and 1970s. President Nixon’s declaration was a widely accepted
depiction of organized crime because it did not deviate from the ideas of former
administrations.
Formed and popularized during highly publicized investigative commissions, the
understanding most Americans had of ‘organized crime’, which had been developing since the
1920s, reflected an entrepreneurial image of a mafia-like organization.3 Until the 1940s, the
expression ‘organized crime’ could refer to any activity that was systemic, illegal and rooted in
American social, economic, and political life.4 In the context of the Cold War, the public
problem harboured a parasitic vision of crime as an external threat to a society, without
internal contradictions. The process of redefining organized crime obliterated the complexities
of legal and illegal entanglements by allowing ‘legitimate’ actors, such as law enforcement
officers and economic elites, to get away with nefarious practices, even though a significant
chunk of white-collar crime is just as ‘organized’ as trafficking (Sutherland, 1949). The
common meaning of organized crime, however, limited business and industry ‘criminals’ to the
corrupt mafia auxiliary, involved only in the service of its activities. Linked to career ‘gangsters’
on the margins of society, the idea of organized crime was then constructed and presented as
a foreign conspiracy against society, rather than an integral part of it (Woodiwiss, 2003).
The new parameters of the problem outlined a social, hierarchical, and relatively uniform
space, tending to establish a clear-cut boundary between the ‘criminal space’ and the “sphere
of legal companies and political institutions” (Briquet and Favarel-Garrigues, 2010: 2). The
image was of a social, political, and economic order that is host to a parasitic external enemy:
a mafia conspiracy that threatens national security through structured criminal organizations.5
In 1960, less than a year before becoming Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, in his book The
Enemy Within, claimed that “if we do not hold a nationwide attack on criminal organizations
with weapons and techniques that are as effective as theirs, they will destroy us” (quoted in
Woodiwiss, 2003: 22). Under President John Fitzgerald Kennedy (JFK), the American
administration began to view crime as one of the federal government’s main priorities,
focusing many of its efforts on the problem of organized crime (Simon, 2008). JFK’s
successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, openly used war metaphors, talking about the ‘War on Crime’,
although he employed this rhetoric more freely for the ‘War on Poverty’, which he initiated
(Simon, 2008).
Crime became a serious national issue in the 1964 presidential campaign, following the
Kefauver and McClellan investigative commissions, after which controlling it came to be seen
as the responsibility of the United States federal government (Andreas and Nadelmann,
2006). During this period of partisan competition and public debate, Johnson responded to his
Republican adversary, Senator Barry Goldwater, by making crime reduction and prevention
one of the federal government’s top priorities. The growing concern with crime led to the
creation of the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in
July 1965 (also known as the Johnson Committee). An ‘organized crime’ working group, as well
as scientists such as economist Thomas Schelling and sociologist/criminologist Donald
Cressey, worked to help define the nature of criminal enterprises. The government’s use of
scientists to demonstrate the reality and gravity of the problem contributed directly to the
identification, justification, and media coverage of the actions taken against organized crime.
The controversial conclusions of the 1967 report submitted by members of the committee and
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the working group (Hawkins, 1969; Morselli and Kazemian, 2004; Naylor, 1997; Reuter, 1983)
confirmed both the meaning given to the expression ‘organized crime’, as well as the sense of
urgency surrounding it. As relayed in a message by President Johnson to Congress in February
1968, the conclusions were that:
Organized crime is a society that seeks to operate outside the control of the American people and their
governments. It involves thousands of criminals, working within structures as complex as those of any large
corporation, subject to laws more rigidly enforced than those of legitimate governments. Its actions are not
impulsive but rather the result of intricate conspiracies, carried on over many years and aimed at gaining
control over whole fields of activity in order to amass huge profits. (Johnson, 1970: 192)
Hawkins (1969) compares this type of statement to a myth, with one of its strengths being its
ability to resonate with popular beliefs that are maintained, even reinforced, by the media and
cultural productions of the period. This type of statement was so dominant that many social
figures (elected politicians, industrialists, lawyers of the ruling elites, law enforcement officers,
and so on) were able to use it to justify their failures, clear their names of potential
accusations, and gain additional resources (Woodiwiss, 2003). The next administration, under
Nixon, followed the previous administration in advocating for greater involvement of the federal
government in fighting criminal activity in general, and drug trafficking in particular. Now
considered to be the ultimate symbol of organized crime, drug traffickers were the main target
in the ‘War’ declared by the new president in the name of national security. To successfully win
this war, the president looked first to his Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)
and then turned to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in 1973.
The BNDD, which had been placed under the authority of the Department of Justice on
President Johnson’s recommendation, had been created in 1968 as the result of the fusion of
the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (previously part of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare) and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (part of the Department of the Treasury since
1930). Before the restructuring in 1968, which was meant to diminish institutional rivalries,
officials from these two federal agencies were among the main entrepeneurs of anti-drug
norms in the United States, both creating and implementing such norms (Becker, 1963). The
efforts of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, in particular, went beyond the strict application and
defense of the law prohibiting the use of opium for which it had been created. Becker (1963)
demonstrates how, with a group of allies, the heads of the Bureau campaigned for the
adoption of new federal legislation, this time prohibiting the use of marijuana. While marijuana
use had been declining as a social practice, in 1937 it became something different: a public
problem subject to punitive action. Guided by moral conviction and institutional opportunity in
a period of fiscal austerity, the Bureau’s officials actively contributed to the success of the
“crusade for moral reform” launched to spread a prohibitionist ideology (Becker, 1963: 171).
They accompanied state leaders in promoting a prescriptive movement to influence public
opinion through an information campaign relayed by the media and amplified emotionally in
films such as the 1936 Reefer Madness. The Bureau also provided many of the statistics and
other objections that appeared in the conclusions of the investigative commissions on
organized crime over the next three decades.
A new ‘super agency’, the DEA, was created in 1973 to replace the ailing BNDD, which
was grappling with internal tensions. DEA officers worked alongside the FBI and collaborated
with border security agents and officers from two other bodies established in 1972, the Office
of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement and the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence. These
successive restructuring operations, which were marked by an unprecedented increase in
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resources, illustrate the status given trafficking, traffickers, and drug users – America’s ‘folk
devils’ – in the early 1970s. As conceptualized by Cohen (1972), the notion of ‘folk devil’ has
since been used “to evoke the image of a scapegoat that symbolically opposes a society … a
social construct that symbolizes evil and instills fear in society” (Sheptycki, 2005: 26).
American finance and the resistance to capital movements regulation
Despite receiving much less media attention, in the early 1970s another set of social
practices, associated with the financial field, began to be formally subject to a new form of
state intervention that was as controversial as it was novel. The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA),
adopted by Congress in 1970, gave the U.S. Department of the Treasury the authority to see
that banks and their customers met the requirments of a series of laws concerning the
declaration and conservation of financial information. Banks had to provide a currency
transaction report (CTR) for any transaction greater than $10,000, and keep records of such
transactions for six years so that they could answer questions in any investigation by the
federal authorities. Financial institutions also had to provide a currency or monetary
instrument report (CMIR) for any transaction in or out of the country greater than $5,000, and
notify the authorities about any customer holding a foreign account with a foreign bank
account report (FBAR). The last two situations also had to be reported to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) by the relevant clients, who had to keep a record of this data. Unlike what its
name suggests, the BSA was not aimed at protecting the principle of bank secrecy but instead
diminishing it (Cuellar, 2003).
In line with its ‘regulatory’ thrust, the BSA criminalized the failure to report transactions.
The BSA was aimed primarily at the use of foreign banks to conceal the proceeds of illegal
activity and to evade federal income taxes (Villa, 1988). Though passed at the beginning of the
federal government campaign against the American mafia (Jacobs and Gouldin, 1999), the
BSA appears not to have been motivated by that effort (Levi and Reuter, 2005: 296). It was
not designed, at least primarily, to fight organized crime but, more generally, to curb
international tax evasion. “The BSA requires businesses to keep records and file reports that
are determined to have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory matters”
(Internal Revenue Service, 2017: 1). The financial provisions in the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), also enacted in 1970 as part of the Organized Crime Control
Act, were specifically designed to give law enforcement authorities more power to seize assets
associated with organized crime. At first officials made relatively little use of this additional
power (Blakey, 1994; Hugues, 2000). But there was an even greater lack of enforcement of
the BSA, which was very negatively received in the financial sector. Bankers claimed it unfairly
interfered with their professional activities and it took a decade before the legislation was
implemented.
It is important to consider the significance, or at least symbolic effect, of the BSA. Prior to
1970, banks were not obligated to inquire about customers’ cash deposits or other
transactions. Although they would probably have had to participate in any ex-post investigation,
the consequences would have been minor. After 1970, financial institutions that refused to
comply with the BSA could be prosecuted, as the act made such neglect punishable by law.
Because this new legislative directive affected bank secrecy, it was met with considerable
resistance, especially since tax evasion had nowhere near the same public status as drug
trafficking, which remained public enemy number one.
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Bank secrecy was deeply entrenched and one concern was that even the slightest
infringement of this principle would lead to stigmatization of state action with regard to flows
of money rather than mobilizing people in its favour. Bankers claimed that their customers’
right to privacy from the state were being violated (Levi, 1991), and the partial infringement of
banking customers’ confidentiality led to a great deal of criticism. Banks voiced their concern
over customers’ uneasiness with the situation as well as the bureaucratic burden of the record
and reporting system inherent in the BSA. One of the recurring themes following the law’s
enactment and the debates associated with it was the increased work associated with the new
responsibilities that banks had to take on. Members of the U.S. Congress tried to reassure
concerned individuals by reminding them that the government was committed to avoiding any
measures concerning financial activities or other elements that could disrupt international
trade (American Bankers Association, 2008). The officer in charge of the case at the
Department of Justice, Will Wilson, offered similar support when he declared that the objective
of the act was “to detect and prosecute crime, not build a mountain of paper” (quoted in
American Bankers Association, 2008: 54). Tensions emerged between those wanting to keep
the existing banking practices and those who felt it was important to impose new regulatory
requirements on financial flows. These tensions continued even after the adoption of the BSA,
with bank representatives supporting and initiating legal challenges.
In 1974 the California Bankers Association and several other groups of plaintiffs
challenged the constitutional validity of the BSA. They argued that its requirements were too
demanding and that it infringed their customers’ privacy. In 1976 the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected the California association’s appeal, which had been backed by the American Civil
Liberties Union. However, on the same day, the Court concluded that customers had been
stripped of several privacy rights pertaining to information held by their banks. In response to
this Supreme Court ruling, as well as several other judgments, in June 1977, several members
of Congress introduced the Right to Financial Privacy Act, which was adopted a year later. The
act had three main provisions intended to end the protests against infringement of privacy
rights in the financial industry. First, law enforcement inquiries had to be justifiable and the
customer had to be notified by the federal agency before the inquiry was conducted. Second,
the customer could contest any request for information by public authorities. Third, federal
agencies had to keep a written record of any customer data consulted and document any
information they shared with other agencies. This policy reversal angered some, who saw it as
an obstacle to their investigations (Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2003).
The Right to Financial Privacy Act became important when DEA agents and their
colleagues from other departments started to show a growing interest in strengthening
measures to crack down on crime proceeds (Levi, 1991), repeatedly arguing that it was
important to follow the money trail in order to disrupt what they saw as organized crime
pyramids. Guided by a parasitic and entrepreneurial vision of criminal organizations, the
strategic approach of targeting money flows was gradually implemented to help defeat drug
lords, as simply arresting them would be insufficient to deal with drug trafficking. This was the
claim made by the former administrator of the DEA, Peter B. Bensiger, before the U.S.
Congress in 1978:
We recognize that the conviction and incarceration of top-level traffickers does not necessarily disrupt
trafficking organizations; the acquisition of vast capital permits regrouping and the incarcerated trafficker
can continue to direct operations. Therefore, it is essential to attack the finances that are the backbone of
organized drug trafficking. (quoted in Naylor, 2004: 162)
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Operation Greenback, launched in Miami in 1980, was the first anti-drug initiative to
bring together officers from several federal institutions (Customs, Department of Justice,
Department of the Treasury, and the IRS) to take advantage of the opportunities provided by
the BSA (President’s Commission on Organized Crime, 2001). In addition to its ability to
disrupt operational efficiency, customs agents identified provisions in the law that offered a
way back into the ‘game’ in the fight against drugs and made it possible to intervene in other
types of inquiries. Following the money trail also allowed tax authorities to reaffirm their place
in large-scale criminal investigations, linking them symbolically with the celebrated ‘Patron
Saint of the IRS’, Elmer Lincoln Irey, and his ‘T-Men’, who, among other things, had helped
bring down Al Capone for tax evasion in 1931 (Irey and Slocum, 1949; Smith, 2013).6 An
alliance, beyond the moral position of preventing criminals from profiting from their
wrongdoings, slowly began to form around a policy focused on making money the target in the
War on Drugs. The key to success would reside in locating, tracking, confiscating, and seizing
crime proceeds. From the ideological perspective of the rational actor (Schelling, 1971),
disrupting the flow of illicit capital places a burden on any ‘criminal enterprise’ as it targets its
primary motivation – money. This deterrent was reinforced by the belief that, without working
capital, setting up new criminal operations becomes much more difficult, sometimes even
impossible. Indeed, “the motivation appeared to be partly fear of what the money might fund
and partly a belief that stripping criminals financially might deter them” (Levi and van Duyne,
2005: 16).
The emphasis placed on drug money and criticism of the Right to Financial Privacy Act
intensified and increasingly resonated within the government after Ronald Reagan took office
1981. As we will see below, the process of reconstructing the problem of illicit money through
its association/reduction to drug trafficking evolved quickly and became explicit following a
media scandal at the intersection of disparate professional representations and interests. This
process ultimately led to the emergence of a new crime – money laundering – in which money
sheds its ontological neutrality and ‘odorless’ character, coming out as officially ‘dirty’ in court
cases and media coverage (Mitsilegas, 2003).
The associational construction of money laundering as a crime
According to Gilmore (2005), the phrase ‘money laundering’ was first used by the police in the
early 1970s. It received a great deal of attention during the Nixon Watergate scandal, with its
related financial crimes. The phrase was clearly not used for drug trafficking alone, but was
employed by the press to evoke “a veritable catalogue of illegal activities and abuses
conceived and directed by the President and his men” (Bernstein and Woodward, 1974: 5). It
was first mentioned in court cases and official reports only in 1982. The Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986 made ‘money laundering’ an official object of public policy as a crime, and
was the first U.S. legislation to specifically refer to the recycling of crime proceeds. This
legislation is therefore fundamental in understanding the meaning attributed to the notion of
dirty money.
Many years before ‘money laundering’ became police jargon, a term used by the media,
and an activity introduced into the criminal code, it referred to a set of older techniques
(Naylor, 2004). The phrase may have emerged in the 1970s but it was inspired by myths
dating back to the Prohibition era in United States, between 1919 and 1933. One of the most
famous stories in mafia folklore is that Al Capone and other gangsters invested their illegal
profits in launderettes so it would look ‘cleaner’. More generally, many individuals and
organizations, seen as legitimate, have been able to devise ways, whether only once or
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systematically, to hide capital generated by transgressing political, economic, commercial, or
fiscal laws. If there was anything new in 1986, it was government officials deciding that these
various money laundering techniques were a problem. This novelty was, however, based on a
selective principle, as the only money targeted was proceeds from drug trafficking.
The Money Laundering Control Act went hand in hand with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, a
product of Reagan’s 1983 President’s Commission on Organized Crime, and was signed into
law almost 20 years after Johnson’s commission. The commission focused on the U.S.’s
interests in Latin America (Friman, 1996), and its final report presented the laundering of drug
money as a significant problem and provided recommendations for dealing with it. Beyond
identifying the problem and explaining how to intervene, there was also a clear attempt to
frame the problem. As Entman (1993: 52) explains, “To frame is to select some aspects of
perceived reality and make them more salient in the communicating text, in such a way as to
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or
treatment recommendation for the item described”. The Reagan Commission report
highlighted systematically the dynamics of laundering associated with ‘drug money’,
suggesting that traffickers had both mastered the art of controlling and disguising illicit money
and monopolized the technique. Limiting the characterization of the dirty money problem to
America’s folk devils conflicted with the scope and variety of issues potentially covered by the
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. The final report of the Reagan Commission included the
conclusions of a preliminary report from 1984, which had examined only the financial aspects
of money laundering, and was entitled ‘The Cash Connection: Organized Crime, Financial
Institutions, and Money Laundering’ (President’s Commission on Organized Crime, 2001).
A few months before the publication of the Commission’s last report, Reagan declared
drug trafficking an existential security threat to the United States, reviving the War on Drugs
rhetoric that the two previous administrations, those of Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy
Carter, had ignored. Simon (2008) highlights the importance of Reagan’s use of the war
metaphor, which hearkened back to Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s term as president from 1933
to 1945. Whether dealing with cancer, poverty, crime, drugs, and later terrorism, several of
Roosevelt’s successors in turn described a supposed existential threat to the nation-state that
came from a monstrous, abnormal enemy capable of penetrating to the very heart of the
ordinary American’s life. At the same time, they called for centralizing government resources
and mobilizing them against the declared enemy, which they portrayed as defeatable only
through coordinated and complex strategies integrated on a federal level (Simon, 2008).
President Reagan employed Roosevelt’s evocation of this ‘enemy’ during his two terms in
office, declaring the War on Drugs a ‘national security’ issue (Helleiner, 1999). This led to
deliberations about the status of bank secrecy, seen on one hand as a professional duty,
including a right to privacy, and on the other as interferring with the War on Drugs (Levi, 2002).
These deliberations eventually resulted in the invention of a new crime – money laundering –
and new regulatory intervention of the state in banking practices. However, this state
interventionism occurred in a hostile context. Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system during Nixon’s administration, Reagan’s presidency saw the development of a policy,
and even a general sense of a movement, often qualified as ’neoliberal’, towards financial
liberalization and an international surge in flows of capital due to the dismantling of national
controls. At first glance, the demonstrated desire for increased federal regulation of flows of
capital did not align with Reagan’s position, presented in one of his more famous quotes:
‘Government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem’. There was also a
legal context created by the Right to Financial Privacy Act, and some banks refused to consider
financial activities in terms of security and fighting crime. However, increasing recognition of
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the efficacy of the ‘follow-the-money’ strategy eventually led to the creation of another area of
legitimization that contributed to an acknowledgement of the problem of money laundering in
the financial industry and, to a lesser degree, the need to provide solutions to it.
The Bank of Boston scandal: Cross-colonization of finance and security
During the 15 years that followed the adoption of the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970, elected
politicians and law enforcement officials condemned the constant lack of cooperation from
banks and the financial industry. Their frustration was clearly articulated in the congressional
report that accompanied the Money Laundering Control Act. Its authors expressed regret that
… unfortunately, the hearings on money laundering, beginning with the Bank of Boston hearing in April
1985, have shown that a major law enforcement tool [the BSA] has been rendered a virtual nullity by an
industry that didn’t seem to care and by a regulatory structure that proved to be ineffective. (American
Bankers Association, 2008: C11)
To remedy this situation, non-compliance sanctions were made more severe and bankers were
constantly reminded of the moral impossibility of acting as intermediaries, rather than
enemies of America’s ‘folk devils’. Although the scope of the BSA’s provisions extend well
beyond drug trafficking, in the 1980s, the consequences of not applying the law were
interpreted only through the prism of this ‘primary problem’. Financial institutions that
attempted to maintain a hardline attitude towards bank secrecy and a lax attitude towards
organized crime ran the risk of appearing to contravene measures being promoted against
lawbreakers. The ethical argument was supported by a narrative based on the devastating
repercussions, in both image and reputation, for banks if they did not comply with the law or
were considered non-cooperative with criminal investigations. The Bank of Boston case is a
good example of this. In 1985, bank executives pleaded guilty to failing to report a total of
$1.22 billions worth of transactions with foreign banks of more than $10,000 between 1980
and 1984 to the IRS. The bank was fined $500,000 for violating the Bank Secrecy Act, a
meager sum compared to the billions that had not been declared, but the legal issue also, and
more importantly, attracted a great deal of negative media attention. There had been relatively
little media coverage of this problem up to this point, especially in print media (Nichols, 1997),
but the Bank of Boston case brought public attention to money laundering issues.
Nichols (1997) demonstrates that the Bank of Boston scandal, rather than simply one of
many examples, became a landmark case that contributed to justifying money laundering
legislation. Legally, the bank had been accused only of failing to declare transactions over
$10,000 under the BSA. However, the failure to report was quickly portrayed by the American
media as synonymous with money laundering. It was associated with organized crime and with
drug trafficking – although without any proof – rather than with international tax evasion. The
emotions raised by the case also contributed to framing, justifying, and the popularizing the
problem of dirty money. The rhetorical exercise of taking one of many cases of undeclared
transactions and turning it into a national money laundering scandal was based on statements
made by federal experts and relayed by the media. These individuals, whether part of the
Treasury or Justice Departments or Reagan’s administration in general, possessed the
institutional authority that allowed them to frame the situation as problematic. In addition, in
conclusions to the President’s Commission on Organized Crime (1984), prosecutor William
Weld and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John Walker once again declared that they
clearly supported the idea of a logical link between violation of the BSA and the problem of
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organized crime and drug trafficking. According to Nichols (1997), from this point on
journalists who reported the Bank of Boston’s failures established a direct relationship
between missing documents and violent crimes, making the reporting of financial transactions
a question of life or death. In this selective narrative about the Bank of Boston scandal, media
professionals assumed the role of intermediaries, accelerators, even co-producers of the
process of construction by association of the public problem of laundering dirty money.
Fifteen years after the adoption of the BSA, the offenses committed by the sanctioned
financial institution were far from exceptional among banks and could also be attributed to
negligence, or even to the absence of federal authorities to enforce the law. The financial
policies Reagan promoted when he first took office and the cuts made to regulatory agencies
certainly did not reverse the trend. In this context, why did the Bank of Boston case become
such a unique scandal “heard more or less around the world” (Palmer, 1985: 25)? Nichols
(1997: 333) argues that this case “served basic goals of law enforcement and mass media”.
On the one hand, the timing and nature of the case were opportune for law enforcement to
send and spread a new message about dirty money and follow-the-money methods. On the
other hand, the combination of transactions reporting failures with issues of corporate non-
compliance, organized crime and drug trafficking was seen as a critical story by newsworkers.
“In other words, although the construction of the case as a landmark narrative was in a sense
arbitrary, the particulars of the case were well suited to presumed interests of majors
claimsmaker groups” (Nichols, 1997: 333).
Indeed, the political context played a major role in the naming and shaming of the Bank
of Boston, while other establishments had slipped through the cracks while committing similar
practices in the past. 1985 was when members of the federal administration formally decided
to crack down on the financial side of organized crime. Furthermore, political activities during
the period leading up to the mid-term elections for the Congress and Senate in 1986 also
helped make drug trafficking and everything associated with it a public problem and a priority
for elected officials as well as in the media and public opinion polls (Reinarman and Levine,
2003). The prosecution of the Bank of Boston was a warning to all banks that liberalization in
the financial sector no longer excluded them from having to adhere to reporting requirements.
The contradiction was apparent only because these requirements were considered a
direct consequence of financial deregulation. The aim was not to make drastic changes in how
the existing banking system functioned, nor to take on all of the illicit flows of money, but to
target the folk devils’ money. The Reagan administration presented their actions as a way to
limit the access of crime organizations, especially to financial institutions. In this context, the
so-called neoliberal turn of the 1980s did not entail a regulatory retreat. The redeployment of
state intervention was aimed at accompanying and facilitating the liberalization of capital
controls while reserving its benefits to ‘legitimate’ capitalist actors and excluding the
‘undesirables’ (Helleiner, 1999). The Bank of Boston scandal erupted one year after the
Reagan presidential commission on money laundering published its mid-term report on the
‘cash connection’. The authors of this report recommended making money laundering a crime
and ending the current complacency in enforcing the BSA that had led to prosecuting only
failures to report and keep records (President’s Commission on Organized Crime, 2001). Using
the same criticism that had been used against the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, their
final report in 1985 also emphasized that officials from the DEA, FBI, IRS, Customs, and the
Departments of Justice and the Treasury supported the criminalization of this social practice,
which was akin to extending federal powers in the financial sector (Nichols, 1997).
Coincidentally, these bureaucratic considerations aligned with how the media was presenting
a story that was seen as having exceptional news and commercial potential. As a result, many
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print publications relayed comments from official sources and dramatized the relatively trivial
Bank of Boston case as an unprecedented scandal, while highlighting the passing of the
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986.
By making money laundering a federal crime in a stronger legislative weapon against
drug trafficking, the 1986 act emphasized the obligations of industry players and penalized
any actor offering financial services that facilitated the integration of money from an illegal
origin into the legal economy. As a result, this type of operation became risker and there was a
greater willingness to cooperate with the appropriate authorities. The legislation also amended
provisions in the Right to Financial Privacy Act by authorizing the postponement of notification
of bank customers who were being monitored as part of an investigation into drug trafficking
or espionage. In light of these changes and the links made between the Bank of Boston
scandal, regulatory non-compliance, and drug money, many banks began working more closely
with regulatory agencies, and ‘oversight’ was acknowledged in order to avoid being the next
legal, political, and media target. From 1985 to 1986, the number of monthly declarations
made as part of the BSA rose from 68,000 to 270,000 (Nichols, 1997). “Fear of crime ha[d]
been converted into fear of not reporting a fellow citizen” (Levi and van Duyne, 2005: 17).
While continuing to criticize legislative developments and policing practices, banks
became concerned about the consequences of this type of bad publicity. In 1986, Eugene
Rossides, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (1969-1973) and now a business lawyer
for a major law firm, sent a written statement to Congress outlining the banking industry’s
stance on the issue.
First, while money laundering is a serious problem that must be vigorously addressed, it does not
necessarily follow that imposing broad new requirements upon banks will solve the problem. Second, I
become concerned when I see the law enforcement community shifting its focus away from drug traffickers
and others in organized criminal groups and preoccupying itself with reporting failures by banks. (quoted in
American Bankers Association, 2008: C11).
Despite its defensive tone, this two-point argument highlights the results of the process of
reconstruction by association of the public problem of dirty money. While the solutions to the
problem remained hotly debated, the problem itself was now seen in the banking world as
limited to only one ‘primary problem’ (drug trafficking), rather than the international tax
evasion that was so broadly targeted by the BSA. From this perspective, since money
laundering was now part of public policy, banks needed to embrace the War on Drugs to avoid
being questioned and associated with tax evasion issues.
At the same time, the parameters of the drug money problem were changing. It was no
longer associated only with a general threat to the nation-state. It was now also a specific
threat to the financial system through issues such as financial integrity and financial stability.
While financial integrity refers to the capacity of the ﬁnancial system to be protected from
criminal misuse, particularly from a reputational point of view, financial stability refers to the
protection of the ﬁnancial system from stress, turmoil, and shocks (Amicelle and Jacobsen,
2016; Boy, 2015).
Liberals recognize that money laundering can pose a potentially serious threat to financial stability. When
financial institutions or markets are found to have close links to individuals in these kinds of serious crimes,
the public confidence on which financial systems depend can be rapidly undermined … Financial
institutions, thus, have a self-interest in complying with money laundering regulations in order to preserve
their ‘reputation’ for trust and security in the marketplace for noncriminal financial business. (Helleiner,
1999: 59).
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Because of the sums infiltrating the legal economy through these institutions, drug
money was seen as compromising public confidence in the financial system, as well as
customers’ trust in their banks. However, this argument has been strongly criticized, starting
with van Duyne (2003: 101-102), for whom “One of the dogmas fuelling the fight against
laundering is the frequently repeated claim concerning the corruptive impact of crime-money
and laundering on the integrity of the financial system … If it applies to the financial system it
also applies to the automobile industry, real estate, tourist offices...” In a similar vein, Levi
(2002) notes that bankers laundered money for centuries from numerous crimes and
countries without apparent prejudice for them or the financial systems and national
economies. Ultimately, van Duyne (2003: 101-102) suggests the impact of dirty money on
both financial integrity and stability is an untested ‘metaphysical dogma’, “behind which one
can discern a heavy dose of opportunism” to stifle potential doubts accross the financial
industry. Following Hülsse (2007), this metaphysical dogma takes the form of a self-fulfilling
prophecy. In this respect, it is less money laundering practices as such that may have a
negative impact on banks and the financial system than the social construction of money
laundering as a public problem. By the mid-1980s, dirty money may really impact any bank
(Hülsse, 2009: 186).
Whether valid or not, the financial integrity/stability argument has had performative
effects in two ways. On the one hand, it was hard for financial actors to maintain a victim
image following the 1986 law, because banks now appeared to be more and more like
accomplices in money laundering (rather than victims who had been deceived into offering up
their services). It was therefore better for them to condemn all business relationships with the
‘folk devils’ and accept that financial activities should also be managed as security problems.
Banks therefore started to admit that anti-money laundering initiatives were, in one way or
another, not only justifiable but necessary and even in their self-interest. It is here that a
specific finance-security space of the ‘conduct of conducts’ has taken shape, “where
technologies of government and technologies of the self intersect” against the problem of dirty
money (Walters, 2011: 15). On the other hand, it was also at this moment that the financial
integrity/stability argument began to fragment the referent object of security, specifically by
introducing the protection of financial order next to the protection of public order and the
Nation-State. While the new 1986 legislation was still not fully accepted, its integration across
the banking industry was facilitated because the Department of the Treasury was responsible
for implementing it. The cross-colonization of the fields of finance and security was underway.
Conclusion
What brought the understanding of money laundering in the United States to the point that an
array of social actors, starting with players from the security and financial fields, rallied behind
public actions that justified transgressing the principle of bank secrecy? In what context and
from what angle did this relatively old social practice, which has occurred at various levels in
society – including the head of state, as seen in the Watergate scandal, for example – become
the crossroads for a range of public, private, political, bureaucratic, media, security, and
financial interests? Ultimately, the answer to both questions can be found in the associational
construction of the dirty money problem.7
In 1970, the BSA restricted bank secrecy, a policy deemed unacceptable by banks, which
resisted its implementation and even challenged its legal provisions in court. This opposition,
which had been tolerated for 15 years and even occasionally backed by the American Civil
Liberties Union in the name of privacy, lost its support when it began to be interpreted as a
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form of cooperation with America's folk devils. The gradual acknowledgment of the problem,
which relied on beliefs and representations about organized crime, and increased action in
dealing with it through the criminalization of money laundering, arose from its symbiotic
relationship with drug trafficking. While this acknowledgment occurred through the almost
exclusive association of money laundering with the politically motivated War on Drugs, it can
also be explained by the dissociation of laundering from other financial crime issues.
Justification for the infringement of bank secrecy, which combined moral and political
convictions with various professional interests, was all the more acceptable because it was
limited to only one type of customer and one kind of illicit flow of money, unlike the provisions
of the BSA. Only the category associated with drug trafficking was targeted by unprecedented
financial policing. This process of associational construction undoubtedly spurred the
continuous expansion of money laundering into other categories, both in the United States and
internationally, which has taken place since the end of the 1980s. As a nod to the BSA, the
last category of social actors added to the international anti-money laundering framework was
tax evasion in 2012. Nevertheless, current research on the application of the anti-money
laundering framework still tends to show that the focus is in line with current national security
priorities – that is, on money made from drug trafficking as well as terrorism and terrorist-
related money.
In theoretical terms, analyzing dirty money as a public problem helps us avoid becoming
trapped in a zero-sum game between securitisation and financialisation. Instead of a linear
and one-way process of colonization of one field over the other (‘securitization of finance’ or
‘financialization of security’), it is possible to apppreciate the cross-colonization of finance and
security logics in the policing of financial activities. Since 1986, the problem of dirty money
and the orientation toward financial policing have emerged through a plurality of intersecting
intentions, stances, and representations, resulting from a series of collaborations and
confrontations between interdependent actors from the fields of finance and security. The
evocative power attached to the malleable notion of ‘dirty money’ resides in the fact that it
remains the meeting point of a constellation of interests; the term’s unclear boundaries allow
each group’s priorities to fit within the confines of policing. Aside from specific influences from
one politician or another, or from a specific national context, the configuration of financial
policing depends largely on this tension between finance and security. As Helleiner (1999: 69)
remind us,
… this pattern of regulatory action has been pursued in order to enable states to curtail illicit financial
movements effectively without undermining their commitment to financial liberalism. In fact, the tension
between financial liberalism and the prohibition of illicit financial activity has not been entirely eliminated.
Following de Goede’s (2010: 106) third avenue for studying finance and security, both
domains demonstrate a “profound conceptual [and political] entanglement” in face of the
problematization of dirty money. As a result, it is impossible now to disentangle financial
security from (inter)national or societal security. At the same time, the dynamic tension
between protecting the financial system and repressing any kind of financial crime seems
difficult, if not impossible, to resolve. While the ‘securitization of finance’ and the
‘financialization of security’ overlap and reinforce each other, this does not mean that in
practice the protection of the current financial order goes hand-in-hand with the policing of
illicit money flows.
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Notes
1. On the historical link between money and dirtiness, see Peebles (2012).
2. The most significant international agreements from the early twentieth century are the
International Opium Commission of 1909 in Shanghai; the International Opium Convention of
1912; the Second Opium Conference of 1925 in Geneva; the Convention for Limiting the
Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs of 1931; the Agreement concerning
the Suppression of Opium Smoking of 1931; and the Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit
Traffic in Dangerous Drugs of 1936.
3. The main investigative commissions prior to Richard Nixon’s presidency were the Wickersham
Commission in 1931; the Kefauver committee in 1951; the McClellan committee in 1963; and the
Johnson committee in 1965. For more on this topic, see Scherrer (2009).
4. For a history of organized crime in the United States, see Woodiwiss (2005).
5. For a critique of this parasitic vision, see Chambliss (1978). The ‘organized’ character of crime has
also been moderated by research demonstrating that the size and extent of criminal associations
have frequently been overestimated. For more on this topic, see Reuter (1983).
6. Before the IRS’s intelligence unit had to compete with other agencies in its fight against the mafia,
the IRS had been one of the pillars in the fight against organized crime, as dramatically depicted in
American propaganda films from the 1940s. See Caporossi (2007).
7. Developed to explicate the social construction of the dirty money problem at the interface of
finance and security, the idea of ‘associational construction’ could also be beneficial in other fields
of research and other subjects of study in the social sciences.
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